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This article discusses North Korea as a case of state-induced famine, or faminogenesis. A famine
from 1994 to 2000 killed 3–5% of North Korea’s population, and mass hunger reappeared in 2010–
2012, despite reforms meant to address the shortage of food. In addition, a prison population of
about 200,000 people is systematically deprived of food; this might be considered penal starvation.
There seems little recourse under international law to punish the perpetrators of state-induced fam-
ine and penal starvation. State-induced famine does, however, ﬁt some of the criteria of genocide in
the United Nations Convention against Genocide, and could also be considered a crime against
humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There would seem, then, to
have been a case for referral of North Korea’s recently deceased leader, Kim Jong Il, to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, and it is still a case for referral of Kim’s successors. However, strategic con-
cerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons outweigh humanitarian concerns about North Korea’s
citizens.
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Introduction
Scholars of genocide know that it is not unusual for governments to kill their own citi-
zens, but two ways that states do this have remained relatively unstudied. The ﬁrst
method is state-induced famine—that is, state policies that create famine. The second is
penal starvation—state policies to starve prisoners to death.
David Marcus coined the term faminogenesis to describe public policies that gener-
ate famine, using Amartya Sen’s deﬁnition of famine as a “particularly virulent manifes-
tation of [starvation] causing widespread death.”1 Marcus presents a typology of four
levels of faminogenic behavior: intentional famine (deliberately using famine as means
of extermination), reckless famine (continuing policies despite evidence of famine),
famine by indifference (turning a blind eye to mass hunger), and famine by incompe-
tence.2 He also recommends that intentional and reckless faminogenesis be speciﬁcally
prohibited by international law. I add to Marcus’s analysis my own recommendation
that penal starvation also be speciﬁcally prohibited by international law, perhaps as a
subcategory of faminogenesis. I deﬁne penal starvation as a state’s deliberate policy to
subject prisoners in penal institutions and camps to starvation rations.
I use the term state-induced famine interchangeably with faminogenesis to clarify
that faminogenesis is often a state activity. The history of the twentieth century reveals
several major cases in which communist states caused citizens to starve. Among those
citizens were the approximately 3.3 million ethnic Ukrainians who starved to death in
the Soviet Union in 1932–1933;3 the 45 million people who starved during Mao Tse-
Tung’s “Great Leap Forward” from 1958 to 1962;4 and the hundreds of thousands who
starved to death in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979. Similarly, both
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communist and fascist regimes used penal starvation as a tool of punishment and exter-
mination. Under Nazi rule, Jews in ghettoes, Soviet prisoners of war,5 and all inmates of
concentration camps faced starvation. Under communism, prisoners in the Soviet
gulag6 as well as the Chinese laogai (prison camp complex)7 were also starved to death.
One might wish to think that state-induced famine and penal starvation disappeared
with the defeat of Nazism and the end of both Soviet and Chinese communism, but
there are still countries where these practices exist—for example, North Korea (formally
named the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). North Korea is an example of reck-
less and possibly intentional faminogenesis.
Examination of North Korea raises the question of whether intentional and reckless
faminogenesis is or should be considered an aspect of the crime of genocide. Knowledge
of the general human rights situation helps to evaluate whether a famine is intentional
or reckless. If a regime denies all human rights, it cannot be deemed less than reckless
in its creation of a famine. Famines do not occur, contends Sen, in countries with func-
tioning multiparty democracies.8 This is because when citizens can exercise their demo-
cratic rights, they can protest against government policies that undermine their access
to food and threaten to vote the government out of ofﬁce. No such recourse is possible
in totalitarian dictatorships such as North Korea.
This article begins with a brief historical background, followed by sections explain-
ing the occurrence of famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s and 2010–2012, and
discussing the legal basis for considering North Korea’s food policies to be at mini-
mum reckless, possibly intentional, faminogenesis. Following this is a section describ-
ing penal starvation and its victims. The article continues with discussion of what
could have been done under international law before the December 2011 death of Kim
Jong Il—North Korea’s leader since 1994—to punish the regime for its use of famine
and penal starvation. At best, I contend, Kim Jong Il was guilty of reckless faminogen-
esis and should have been prosecuted accordingly, had a law prohibiting reckless
faminogenesis existed. In the absence of such a law, Kim should have been prosecuted
for the many crimes again humanity—and possibly crimes of genocide—he had
committed. Should the leaders who took over after Kim Jong Il’s death continue his po-
licies, they will also become candidates for such prosecution. However, as the ﬁnal sec-
tion explains, the international community’s strategic and security interests in North
Korea render it unlikely that the rulers of the country will be tried for any of these
crimes.
Before continuing, a note is necessary on sources. This article relies in part on news
reports, reports from international human rights non-governmental organizations, and
books written by reporters and activists. These sources, in turn, rely heavily on inter-
views with North Korean refugees in South Korea and northern China; interviews in
China are clandestine. It is almost impossible for foreigners to enter North Korea and
those who do enter are very carefully watched. Nevertheless, the testimony that the vari-
ous researchers have accrued over the years, especially since large numbers of people
started to enter China illegally during the famine of the mid-1990s, is remarkably con-
sistent and can be considered reliable. As of 2001, 2,300 refugee accounts existed;9 by
2011, there were many more. These are not sensationalist accounts; researchers are very
careful to cross-check them when they can and, if possible, to conduct methodologically
sound surveys of refugees.10 Taken as a whole and checked against other sources, refu-
gees’ accounts can be considered reasonably reliable.
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Historical Background
North Korea, a state severely isolated and cut off from the international community, is
a creation of the Cold War. From 1910 to 1945, the Korean Peninsula was colonized by
the Japanese. At the end of World War II, the Americans and Soviets agreed that Korea
would be split at the 38th parallel, a line arbitrarily chosen as it roughly divided this
ancient kingdom into two equal parts. Kim Il Sung, allegedly a heroic guerilla leader
against the Japanese in Manchuria,11 was chosen by the Soviet Union to lead the North.
In 1950, anticipating an easy victory, he attacked the South. The United Nations and
the United States came to the defense of the South, leading newly Communist China to
enter the war on the side of the North. An extremely brutal, three-year war ensued in
which hundreds of thousands died, many from American bombs and napalm.12 North
Korea is estimated to have suffered 300,000 military and 400,000 civilian deaths.13 In
1953, the two parties signed a truce and retreated to their respective sides of the 38th
parallel. There is no peace treaty, and the two Koreas are still technically at war, leaving
a heavily defended demilitarized zone between the two states.
North Korea’s ofﬁcial ideology, introduced in 1970, is called Juche, comprising
“self-control, independence, and self-sufﬁciency”14—in a word, self-reliance. The re-
gime also perpetuates a mythology that its hereditary rulers represent “the will of both
heaven and earth.”15 Kim Il Sung died in 1994 and was succeeded by his son Kim
Jong Il, who ruled North Korea until his death; he, in turn, was succeeded by his own
son, Kim Jong Un. While Kim Jong Il lived a life of luxury, enjoying Western movies,
Western food cooked by imported chefs, and “entertainment women,”16 the over-
whelming majority of the population lived on the edge of starvation. The ofﬁcial organ
controlling the state is the Korean Workers’ Party,17 supplemented by an extremely
large military of approximately 1.1 million people out of an estimated population of
24.5 million.18
In the 1950s and 1960s, North Korea was more prosperous than its southern neigh-
bor.19 In part, this was because it had inherited most of the industrial capacity and in-
frastructure created under Japanese rule;20 in part it was because the Soviet Union
heavily subsidized its economy.21 When the Soviet Union de-Stalinized in the 1950s,
North Korea turned to China for infrastructure, energy, and food support. Food
shortages occurred in 1945–1946 (just after WWII), 1954–1955 (just after the Korean
War), and 1969–1974,22 and food rations began to decline steadily from about 1970.23
Moreover, industry and infrastructure quickly declined as a result of inadequate mainte-
nance, poor management, lack of spare parts, and lack of an external market for the
shoddy goods that the factories produced.24
Problems in food production were caused in large part by highly inefﬁcient, collec-
tivized agriculture. Immediately after World War II, the government seized all land be-
longing to Japanese colonialists and Korean landlords and redistributed it to peasants.
The initial redistribution was unsuccessful and food production fell. The government
then collectivized all land in the 1950s,25 ﬁrst in cooperative farms and then in state
farms. Above a certain minimum left for farmers’ own consumption, the entire harvest
had to be turned over to the state, which distributed it to citizens through the Public
Distribution System (PDS) adopted in 1950. Outside the collectivized farms, only very
tiny “micro-farms” on which citizens could cultivate fruits and vegetables and keep
small animals, poultry, and bees for their personal consumption or for periodic, legal
farmers’ markets were allowed.26
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About 62% of the people, mainly urban, were dependent on the PDS for all their
food. The PDS distributed food according to a scale that privileged some categories—
especially members of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and the military, and heavy
industry workers.27 Even with the PDS system in place, however, the country relied on
food aid from its Communist allies—the Soviet Union and China—as early as the
1980s, as its own production of food substantially declined.28 Thus, North Korea’s col-
lectivized system of food production, its refusal to allow almost any private production
of food, its prohibition of food markets, and its reliance on food rationing all set the
stage for the famines of the 1990s and 2000s.
Famine
In the early 1990s, the World Food Programme (WFP) described the food situation in
North Korea as a “famine in slow motion.”29 By the mid-1990s, it was experiencing a
major famine. While many refugee, newspaper, and other reports cited ﬁgures of up to
3 million out of a then population of 23 million as having died between 1994 and
2000,30 scholarly accounts present a lower ﬁgure of about 600,000 to 1 million dead.31
A South Korean scholar using several types of demographic and statistical data con-
cluded that between 580,000 and 1.1 million people lost their lives during the famine of
1994–2000, or 3–5% of the population.32
North Korea attributed the famine to natural disasters, citing poor harvests and
ﬂooding in 1995. But these “natural” disasters were in large part a consequence of poor
decisions by the central government in the 1980s about agricultural policies, which exa-
cerbated the earlier food shortages caused by collectivized food production and distribu-
tion. During the 1980s, the government ordered continuous cropping and overuse of
chemical fertilizers, which eroded soil quality; there was also much soil erosion and
deforestation as hills were denuded of trees to provide more land for cultivation.33
When the ﬂoods came, terraced hillsides simply collapsed. By this point there was very
little agricultural machinery or fuel; much cultivation was by hand.
This extremely poor agricultural policy was exacerbated when, in the early 1990s,
both Russia and China cut their food and fuel aid to North Korea.34 Russia, the succes-
sor state to the Soviet Union, had no interest in subsidizing Communist states abroad.
Chinese exports of maize to North Korea declined by 80% from 1993 to 1994, in part
because of a poor harvest in China itself and in part as punishment to North Korea for
having opened up diplomatic relations with Taiwan.35 Both Russia and China informed
North Korea that it would have to start paying market prices in hard currency for their
exports.36
The regime responded by describing the famine as an “Arduous March.”37 Adopt-
ing a disingenuous approach to the famine’s causes, Kim Jong Il ﬁrst urged upon his
subjects the virtues of eating only two meals a day,38 then one, while in the meantime at-
tributing the famine to an imperialist blockade against North Korea.39 At the same time,
the regime reduced farm families’ grain rations by 35%, far below subsistence level.40 Ra-
tions under the PDS also appeared to have been completely cut off to the northeast in
1994.41 Nevertheless, privileged groups—especially members of the government, the
military, and the Korean Worker’s Party—continued to receive rations.42
Reports on the famine, many by refugees, are heartbreaking. A refugee doctor de-
scribed wasted (emaciated) children whose desperate mothers had fed them weeds
and wild grasses. Unable to digest this food, children appeared in the doctor’s under-
equipped North Korean hospital with severe medical complications, or simply with a
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vague malaise that preceded their deaths; babies died from lack of mother’s milk.43
Often parents and grandparents denied themselves food so that children could eat;44
sometimes entire families killed themselves.45 Married women prostituted themselves in
order to obtain money to buy food for their children.46 Homeless children were reputed
to be cannibalized;47 one refugee reported witnessing the public execution of a 28-year-
old man accused of eating a four-year-old child;48 and the WFP requested the right to
inspect farmers’ markets where it was reported that “special meat” on offer was actually
human ﬂesh.49 Ironically, in this devastated land, the very children dying of starvation
were taught a song about how they had “nothing to envy” from the rest of the world.50
In 1998, a survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),WFP, and the
European Union (EU) found that 60% of North Korean children were stunted and 50%
malnourished.51 A survey conducted by the UN and EU in 2002 found that the average
North Korean, 7-year-old boy was 20 centimeters shorter and 10 kilograms lighter than
his counterpart in South Korea.52 Indeed, the height requirement for entry into the
North Korean military was reduced because so many military-age men were stunted.53
Once the actual famine ended around 2000 as a result of better weather, international
food aid, and some policy reforms, a “chronic food emergency” nevertheless ensued
well into the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century.54
After the worst of the famine in the 1990s, the government introduced some re-
forms in food production and distribution. As early as 1987, it had decided to permit
industrial workers to cultivate small plots of land at their under-producing factories
and to permit farmers to expand their personal plots and trade in illegal—though toler-
ated—farmers’ markets.55 The factories were given some autonomy from state control
and were granted permission to trade manufactured products among themselves and in
international markets.56 The state deregulated cooperative farms and permitted farmers
to keep a larger proportion of the food they produced.57 Men were sometimes obliged
to spend time at factories even if there was neither work nor wages for them, while
women, who were less likely to be obliged to spend time at factories, began to engage in
“sideline” production, selling home-cooked food or handicrafts.58 The state turned a
blind eye to private markets that sprang up in urban areas, indeed legalizing them in
2002.59 The government also decided to change the pricing structure to reﬂect domestic
real market conditions, aligning ofﬁcial prices more closely with black-market prices.
Economic reforms that introduced the basic elements of a market economy were
absolutely necessary to put North Korea on the path to real self-sufﬁciency in food,
in contrast to the ofﬁcial ideology of Juche that claimed to be a prescription for self-
sufﬁciency. However, the reforms also had their own detrimental consequences.
Although wages were increased, prices rose as well.60 Moreover, the reforms did not
appear to cause a substantial increase in production,61 as farms and factories still lacked
necessary inputs and fuel.62 As a result, North Korea faced the classic inﬂationary sce-
nario of too much money facing too few goods—especially too little food.
By 2005, a new system of stratiﬁcation between rich and poor had developed; those
who had access to hard currency63 either through remittances (mostly from Japan or
China), smuggling across the border with China, or crime (such as exporting arms or
narcotics64) could buy what little food was in the market, while those dependent on
meager state wages could not buy what they needed. Thus, this incomplete, regulated,
“socialist” marketization resulted in high rates of post-famine malnutrition for those
who could not ﬁnd ways to earn hard currency. Moreover, in its attempt to marketize
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the economy, the government abolished the PDS in 2002 except for the top 1 or 2 mil-
lion people in the country.65 Those many other North Koreans who had relied on the
PDS were suddenly forced to either cultivate their own food or buy food in markets;
many lacked the resources to do either. About 50% of formerly PDS-dependent house-
holds were unable to meet their caloric requirements.66 Complicating matters even fur-
ther, in 2005, the state overturned some of its reforms. It once again banned the private
buying and selling of grain67 and reintroduced the PDS.68 As of 2008, markets were
again closed and women under 40 were no longer allowed to trade, even though women
were the mainstays of their families.69
Finally, a currency reform in late 2009 effectively wiped out the savings of those
North Koreans who were managing to make money in private markets, which they had
been using to purchase food. Citizens were obliged to turn in their banknotes, which
were replaced at a rate of 1 per 100 wons.70 This was one of the few times that some
parts of the population showed their displeasure, with demonstrations taking place
against the regime. In response, the government executed Pak Nam Gi—the ofﬁcial in
charge of the reform—and sent three dozen of his relatives to prison.71
Partly as a consequence of these incomplete and erratic reforms, severe food
shortages causing malnutrition and death returned by the end of the decade. This food
shortage was partly a result of a lack of seeds, fertilizer, fuel, storage capacity, and ad-
vanced agricultural technology.72 By 2008, the country was “once again on the brink of
starvation,” with families eating grass, tree bark, and poisonous mushrooms that could
cause death by diarrhea in young children.73 Matters were made worse by periodic cam-
paigns to boost industrial production, which removed farmers from their ﬁelds; “We
are being led to our deaths,” said one such farmer.74 These campaigns continued in
2010–2011 as preparations were made to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of
Kim Il Sung in 2012.
Rations in 2010 met less than half the daily food needs of the 68% of the population
dependent upon them.75 In early 2011, North Korea was begging for food aid as a result
of a hard winter, ﬂoods, and the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among its animals.76
In March 2011, estimates were that 6.1 million people—about a quarter of the popula-
tion—were at severe risk of starvation, especially in the northern and eastern pro-
vinces.77 Diplomats reported that food rations had been halved in 2010–2011,78 while
“feral children” ate dead dogs and rotten food in the markets.79 By November 2011, a
visiting UN ofﬁcial found that about a third of the children under ﬁve were at risk of
long-term effects of malnutrition.80 Even members of the military, normally favored by
the regime, were suffering malnutrition.81
This short description of North Korean economic policy cannot explain all the de-
cisions that caused famine in the 1990s and mass hunger, if not famine, again in 2010–
2011.82 In brief, until 2000, North Korea was a dogmatic, highly authoritarian state that
refused to make even the mildest reforms. In the twenty-ﬁrst century, reform was
erratic and internally contradictory—in a word, incompetent at best. Thus, food
shortages have been severe for two decades, reaching acute stages from 1994 to 2000
and again in 2010–2012.
The Crime of Faminogenesis
To determine how, if at all, Kim Jong Il should have been treated under international
law, it is ﬁrst necessary to assess in which category of faminogenesis his actions
fell. Marcus’s four categories are intentional, reckless, indifferent and incompetent
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faminogenesis; he argues that the ﬁrst and second categories should be prohibited and
punished. To reiterate, famine is intentional if the state deliberately uses it as a means of
extermination; it is reckless if the state continues its food policies despite evidence of
famine. North Korea’s famines are at minimum reckless; over two decades the state con-
tinued policies that resulted in underproduction and maldistribution of food. The re-
gime’s consistent disregard for its citizens’ food needs, its imprisonment of those
committing “crimes” such as hoarding, and its suppression of those civil and political
rights that might have permitted citizens to communicate their needs to the government
also suggest intentional famine, though stronger evidence of mens rea than can be pro-
vided in this article may be required in a court of law to prove intentional famine.
Marcus argues that some of the North Korean government’s actions during the
1990s famine constituted the ﬁrst-degree crime of intentional faminogenesis. He accuses
the government of “manipulating the famine to target certain populations that threaten
its political survival” by denying them food rations.83 During the 1990s famine, “it was
persistently reported that PDS rations were delayed or temporarily suspended in the
northern parts of the country.”84 However, Haggard and Noland state that they “ﬁnd
no evidence that particular segments of the population were deliberately starved.”85
They consider evidence demonstrating that the regime cut off four northern provinces
to be circumstantial, although they note that there is evidence that the government
focused food aid on the western coast, despite evidence that the (north) east coast was
facing particularly severe food shortages.86
Haggard and Noland’s view is that “informational failures and the lack of account-
ability characteristic of authoritarian regimes played a crucial role” in the famine.87 This
suggests that the government was guilty of the second-degree crime of reckless famino-
genesis, continuing policies that caused famine even when their consequences were
known. Not permitting citizens to farm small plots of land was reckless; as such farms
could have produced food to supplement ofﬁcial rations. Prohibition of trade and fora-
ging was also reckless. In Marcus’s view, “North Korea’s behavior in refusing to admit
that its policies are ﬂawed . . . constitutes a second-degree famine crime.”88 The same
might be said of the famine of 2010–2012, which was caused in part by the regime’s
continuation of these extremely ﬂawed policies. Recklessness is implied, for example, by
the 2005 decision to rescind the reforms that had been implemented to assist in creating
a market economy.
Incompetence, Marcus’s fourth degree of faminogenesis, is the most generous
description of a regime that followed policy prescriptions from the Soviet Union and
China that had been abandoned by both countries by 1990. On the other hand, the fact
that North Korea sought food aid during the 1990s famine, and again in 2010–2012,
suggests that the regime was not indifferent to the famine, thus not guilty of the third
degree of faminogenesis. The regime did seek international help during the 1990s, ask-
ing South Korea, the UN, and the US for food aid.89 However, there was some suspicion
that the food was not disbursed to the neediest citizens; rather, it seemed that the mili-
tary was well fed while others starved.90 The regime may simply have treated food aid
as balance-of-payments assistance: the less it spent on food, the more it had to pay off
debts.91
Feffer claims the famine was not deliberate, but rather was a result of ‘“atrocious
policy.”92 Haggard and Noland also argue that “the famine was a classic case of state
failure,”93 rather than having been deliberately constructed. However, these arguments
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seem to inadvertently imply that the policies were made by honest bureaucrats who
accidentally made poor decisions; they run contrary to Marcus’s view that the govern-
ment recklessly continued these policies even when their consequences became known.
An alternate view is that the regime made decisions according to its own interests,
regardless of the effects on some sectors of the population. As long as members of the
Korean Workers’ Party and the military—along with the relatively privileged inhabi-
tants of the capital, Pyongyang—were fed, the regime could ignore its other citizens.
The regime also denied all human rights, so that citizens could not make their con-
cerns known. Systematic denial of human rights during severe food shortages suggests
at minimum reckless faminogenesis. The state deliberately denies itself a key resource—
the voices of its own people—that could help rectify its faminogenic policies. North
Koreans enjoy no freedom of speech, assembly, or press; no political right to vote; and
no civil rights to protection from torture or arbitrary execution. Citizens cannot protest
the policies causing them to starve, nor can they vote their leaders out of ofﬁce; if they
do protest, they risk imprisonment, torture, and death. They cannot fulﬁll their need for
food when they are not permitted freedom of movement to leave the country or even
within it.
Moreover, North Koreans, enjoy no right to privacy whatsoever: neighbors are en-
couraged to spy on neighbors and all citizens must attend self-criticism sessions where
they must confess and repent for even the tiniest acts that might be considered disloyal.
Thus, independent thought and conversation are completely blocked by a system in
which neighbors can and do report each other for “crimes” against the state such as
foraging for, producing, and selling food, or even complaining about food shortages.
Radios and televisions are wired so that they can receive only state channels94 which
broadcast propaganda into every household,95 thus prohibiting the spread of informa-
tion about food shortages that might cause unrest.
Another major policy “error” in North Korea is prohibition of private property.
The right to own property is protected by Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). This right helps individuals be self-sufﬁcient rather than rely
on the state to provide for all their needs. Aside from the micro-farms described above,
no personal cultivation of land was permitted in North Korea until the 1990s96 and
there is still no private ownership of land. Even in the brief period of ﬂowering markets
during the early 2000s, no reforms were introduced to enable individuals to own the
land they were farming. Yet individual land rights have been shown to result in “higher
productivity, cultivation and yields, as well as the retention of surpluses against the risk
of climatic disaster.”97
All these denials of citizens’ human rights are consequences of deliberate policy de-
cisions. A government concerned with the welfare of its citizens would not continue
policies that cause its citizens to starve. Thus, the regime is recklessly faminogenic, pro-
hibiting human rights that could avert or alleviate famine. It is not quite as easy to
make a case for intentional faminogenesis, especially given the inconsistent and erratic
“reforms” the state introduced after the mid-1990s. In either case, though, denial of
citizens’ civil and political rights is a key cause of the starvation. Not enjoying any of
these rights, North Koreans resort to occasional protests, strikes, uprisings, sabotage,
and even murders of local ofﬁcials.98 There have also been reports of attempted assassi-
nations and coups d’état, suggesting dissension within the ruling clique and/or the
military.99
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The Crime of Penal Starvation
The North Korean regime is responsible not only for famine, but also for a deliberate
policy of subjecting its prisoners to starvation rations. The government maintains a
large system of repressive slave labor camps—in effect, a gulag—in which prisoners are
even more likely to starve than the general population. Rations are far below what is
needed to maintain health and were so even before the food shortages and famine of
the 1990s: “Prisoners are provided only enough food to be kept perpetually on the verge
of starvation.”100 Food is allocated on the basis of productivity: the less a prisoner pro-
duces, the less he eats, resulting in a spiral downward as those deprived of even more
food produce less and less. Many in the camps die from lack of food, while some are
executed for foraging; in one case a prisoner was executed for eating ripe chestnuts that
had fallen at the entrance of a slave labor mine.101
I use the term penal starvation to describe this phenomenon. Penal starvation does
not cause death in the manner to which Sen refers, in which malnutrition spreads over
wide populations. Rather, it attacks a signiﬁcant percentage of prisoners who cannot live
on rations constantly below subsistence level, or whose food rations are even lower than
the prescribed below-subsistence level because they do not work hard enough or have an-
gered the authorities in some other way. Estimates of how many people are in the prison
camps at any time vary, but most sources agree on about 200,000 every year.102 Pierre Ri-
goulot, publishing originally in 1997, estimated that 1.5 million people had died in the
camps since the creation of North Korea.103 Becker’s lower estimate suggested that as of
2005, 1 million people had died, assuming an annual death rate of 10% of prisoners.104
Inmates in these camps fall into two major groups. The ﬁrst is people who have
been imprisoned for political reasons or because they belong to population categories
that the regime considers disloyal or dangerous. Over the course of North Korea’s his-
tory, tens of thousands of people have been imprisoned in various political purges.105
The state also classiﬁes every individual citizen on the basis of perceived loyalty, or lack
thereof, to the regime: the three classes are the core, or loyal, class; the wavering class;
and the hostile class. South Korea estimates that these categories constitute 30, 50, and
20% of the population respectively.106 Membership in the three core classes is hereditary;
for example, an individual might be deemed a member of the hostile class if his great-
grandfather was a landlord. Members of the hostile class are most likely to be sent to the
gulag; they were also the ﬁrst to have their rations cut during the 1990s famine.107
Some other categories of people are so despised that they are frequently sent to
prison camps where they suffer a high risk of starvation. In the past, North Korea im-
prisoned Japanese-Koreans; that is, Koreans who had lived in Japan when Korea was
under Japanese colonial rule, but had been badly treated there. Some of the estimated
93,000 returnees from Japan were incarcerated.108 Christians are also imprisoned or
executed;109 the earliest massacre of Christians appears to have taken place in Novem-
ber 1945,110 and it is believed that the government executed about 400,000 religious
practitioners (not all Christians) during the 1970s.111 In the past, moreover, disabled
people were sent to special concentration camps in accordance with the Kims’ (father
and son) belief that North Koreans ought to be physically perfect.112 The Kims had a
particular aversion to dwarfs, who along with other disabled people were exiled from
the capital.113 Dwarfs were put in special prison camps and subjected to forced steriliza-
tion. It appears, however, that in the last two decades disabled people have been some-
what better treated and are less likely to be imprisoned.114
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Not only those convicted of crimes, but also their families, including parents,
spouses, siblings, and children, are imprisoned. This is in accordance with Kim Il
Sung’s 1958 directive that “[prison] inmates are class enemies and must be actively ex-
terminated to three generations,”115 which was apparently repeated in 1972: “Factional-
ists or enemies of class, whoever they are: their seed must be eliminated through three
generations.”116 Thus, for example, Kang Chol-Hwan, author of a rare memoir of the
camps, was incarcerated at the age of nine because his grandfather was suspected of a
crime; Kang survived partly by eating rats.117 This form of collective punishment is one
reason why the gulag contains so many prisoners.
The second group of prisoners is made up of people whose actions in search of
food are considered illegal. Their crimes consist of engaging in petty trade, cultivating
small plots of land, hoarding food,118 foraging, traveling within the country in search of
food,119 stealing food, smuggling and other black market activities, and cannibalism. It
is estimated that about 200–300,000 people ﬂed to China during the 1990s famine:120
China returns refugees to North Korea, where most are then imprisoned and “re-
starved.” Having committed what the state considers to be crimes in order to survive
the famine, they are incarcerated and deliberately subjected to starvation rations. It is
not yet known, however, whether North Korea engaged in the same policy of incarcer-
ating people who were trying to ﬁnd food in 2010–2012 as it did during the 1990s.
Applying Marcus’s four categories of intentional, reckless, indifferent, and incom-
petent famine to penal starvation, it appears clear that penal starvation is intentional.
The state decides whom to imprison, it decides on food rations for prisoners, and it de-
cides that prisoners can be deprived of food for various further transgressions while in
prison, such as not working hard enough. Thus, as a subset of faminogenesis, penal star-
vation should be punished as a ﬁrst-degree famine crime, although again, a court of law
might require stronger proof of mens rea that I can supply here.
International Law: The Question of Genocide
If famine in North Korea is at minimum reckless and possibly intentional, and if penal
starvation is clearly intentional, then how, if at all, can international law stop these two
practices? One possibility is to pressure North Korea to live up to its formal commit-
ments to uphold those human rights covenants to which it is party. North Korea
became party to both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
on 14 September 1981. The ICESCR includes the right to adequate food (article 11[1])
and freedom from hunger (article 11[2]). But as discussed above, this right cannot
stand alone: in order to have access to enough food, citizens must also enjoy their civil
and political rights.
It is unlikely, however, that the North Korean regime will be susceptible to pressure
to protect human rights. In a facade of legality, the regime has introduced constitutional
changes that are supposed to—but do not—protect human rights on several occasions.
In 1998, a constitutional revision introduced habeas corpus and revisions in 2004 pro-
hibited arrests and detention not in accordance with the law, required warrants for ar-
rests, and introduced other such procedural guarantees.121 In 2009, the constitution was
revised ostensibly to protect human rights.122 For example, articles 65–68 protected
equal rights; the right to vote; freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, and
association; and freedom of religion.123 At the same time, however, the principle of
“military ﬁrst” was included, allocating resources to the military before any other sector
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of society.124 There is no indication that North Korea now respects the rights written
into the 2009 constitution.
Since the regime is unlikely to protect human rights, the possibility of punishing its
leaders must be considered. It is possible that Kim Jong Il could have been referred to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the crime of genocide before his death in
December 2011. In 1996, Kim apparently said that North Korea only needed 30% of its
populace to survive in order to reconstruct a “victorious” North Korean society, sug-
gesting a very high tolerance for mass deaths among those for whom he was supposed
to be responsible.125
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNCG) is meant to protect groups at risk of genocide because of their
race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality.126 Certain groups that ﬁt these categories have
been targeted for extermination in North Korea. North Korean Christians are one such
group, as adherence to Christianity is viewed as treason against the Juche philosophy
and the Kim dynasty. A second group is Japanese-Koreans, whose situation has been
described above. A third is Korean-Chinese infants,127 who are considered to be “pollut-
ing” the pure Korean race. These infants are the children of North Korean mothers who
ﬂed or were trafﬁcked to China, where they sometimes voluntarily married and some-
times were forcibly married or prostituted to Chinese men. In violation of its obligations
under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR), as dis-
cussed below, China returns refugees to North Korea. Eyewitnesses have recounted that
if these women are pregnant when they return, they are made to undergo forced abor-
tions. If they are in the late stages of pregnancy, delivery is induced and the infants
are then murdered or tossed alive into garbage cans before their mothers’ eyes.128 This
can be considered “ethnic infanticide,” which constitutes “killing of members of a
group.”129
While the particular cases of Christians, Japanese-Koreans, and Chinese-Korean in-
fants may ﬁt the UNCG deﬁnition of victim groups, the majority of people subjected to
state-induced famine or penal starvation do not ﬁt this deﬁnition. Rather, the North
Korean regime commits politicide, deﬁning “victim groups . . . in terms of their political
status or opposition to the state.”130 The famine of the 1990s and the continuing risk of
starvation in the twenty-ﬁrst century affects all North Koreans except the core, inner
elite; even members of the military and of the Korean Workers’ Party are at risk. More-
over, disproportionate incarceration of members of the hostile class might be consid-
ered a form of politicide; certain categories of people deemed to be politically unreliable
are at substantially increased risk of penal starvation. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s
deﬁnition of genocide applies to North Korea: “Genocide is a form of one-sided mass
killing [for example, by state-induced famine and penal starvation] in which a state or
other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are de-
ﬁned by the perpetrator.”131 The perpetrator—the North Korean regime—deﬁnes some
citizens as hostile and starves them accordingly.
Even if some of North Korea’s famine victims ﬁt the UNCG’s deﬁnition of victim
groups, however, the crime of faminogenesis is not speciﬁed in the UNCG. Yet both the
intentional and the reckless varieties of state-induced famine cause serious bodily harm
to members of a group and also inﬂict “conditions of life calculated to bring about
[a group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part,” thus fulﬁlling aspects of genocide
as deﬁned in article 2 (b) and (c) of the UNCG.132 State-induced famine also prevents
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births within a group, a practice prohibited by Article 2 (d), as starving women are not
capable of conception. The group, in this case, is made up of all North Korean citizens.
A further difﬁculty in proving a charge of genocide against Kim Jong Il is the ques-
tion of intent. Did Kim intend to kill 3–5% of North Korea’s citizens, or was he merely
reckless in continuing his economic policies even when it was obvious that they caused
starvation? Jasper Becker, a journalist, contends that “the most heinous part of the story
is that the leadership, especially Kim Jong Il, resisted adopting every policy that could
have brought the misery [of the 1990s] to a quick end. This makes the suffering he in-
ﬂicted on an entire people an unparalleled and monstrous crime.”133 Paul French
agrees, noting, “At no time did the state admit to any ideological, economic, or systemic
problems as causes of the . . . famine.”134 Indeed, it might seem that resistance to eco-
nomic reform, combined with complete denial of all civil and political rights; diversion
of food aid to support the Korean Workers’ Party, the military, and the elite; and dis-
crimination against some provinces in provision of food, add up to evidence of intent.
Nevertheless, none of these elements provides the “smoking gun” proving that Kim
wanted to kill his own population, and his frequent appeals for international food aid
suggest the contrary.
A further gap in international law is the absence of a speciﬁc crime of penal starva-
tion. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
ruled that whenever individuals or groups are unable to enjoy the right to adequate
food via their own means, the state has the obligation to directly fulﬁll that right.135 The
United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners specify that
“every prisoner shall be provided . . . with food of nutritional value adequate for health
and strength.”136 These rules can be read to protect not only “normal,” individual pris-
oners, but also large groups of people deliberately incarcerated and subjected to rations
below the subsistence level. This positive obligation to provide food, however, fails to
penalize states that deliberately starve large numbers of prisoners as a matter of policy
or of common—and encouraged—practice. Nor is penal starvation speciﬁed as an act
of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in the Convention against Torture,137
although it is obviously extremely cruel and degrading to force individuals to beg,
scrounge, smuggle, steal, kill, and even become cannibals in their search for food.
Even if referral to the ICC for genocide was not possible, a strong case could have
been made that Kim Jong Il was guilty of almost all the crimes against humanity the
ICC prohibits, including murder, torture, deportations, enslavement, and persecu-
tion.138 There is no speciﬁc mention of state-induced famine or penal starvation in the
list of crimes against humanity; rather, it seems these two crimes would qualify merely
as “other inhumane act[s] . . . intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health.”139 Grace Kang argues that food deprivation in
prison camps can be considered acts of murder or extermination, reinforcing the argu-
ment that Kim Jong Il should have been referred to the ICC.140 Similarly, Debra Liang-
Fenton argues that “the North Korean government is actively involved in committing
crimes against humanity with respect to both its food policy leading to famine and its
treatment of political prisoners;” these are crimes against humanity because the govern-
ment knowingly engages in policies that cause hunger and starvation.141
In October 2011, a coalition of human rights groups launched a campaign in
Tokyo to have the United Nations establish a commission of inquiry into crimes against
humanity in North Korea.142 As of the time of writing (August 2012), however, North
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Korea was not party to the ICC; thus, were he still alive, Kim Jong Il would have to be
referred to the court by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Such referral
either of him or of his successor, Kim Jong Un, was and is unlikely, as North Korea has
been testing nuclear weapons and the geostrategic concern to contain its nuclear ambi-
tions tops the international community’s agenda, as discussed further below. North
Korea has, however, been referred to the ICC by South Korea for a possible war crime.
In March 2010, a South Korean ship, the Cheonan, sank, resulting in the loss of 46 lives.
An international commission determined that a North Korean torpedo had struck it
and in December 2010 the ICC opened a preliminary investigation into whether the
sinking of the Cheonan was a war crime.143 This suggests some willingness on the part
of the international community to refer North Korea to the ICC while concurrently try-
ing to negotiate with the regime to curb its development of nuclear weapons.
Another aspect of international law that might be useful in protecting North Kor-
eans is refugee law. It is estimated that by 2009, between 100,000 and 300,000 North
Koreans were living in China.144 China has been party to the UN Convention on Refu-
gees since 1982; thus, it is obligated to protect refugees ﬂeeing North Korea because of
political or religious persecution. This entails setting up a refugee adjudication process
and allowing the UN High Commissioner for Refugees access to North Koreans in
China.145 China also should protect refugees who have had contact with South Koreans,
missionaries, or aid workers, as they are likely to be punished more harshly than other
returnees should they be sent back to North Korea; people who went to church in
China, for example, are sentenced to ten years in prison camps.146 China is also obli-
gated to protect those many female refugees—both women and girls—who end up
working in the sex trade147 and to make sure that they are not persecuted if they are re-
turned to North Korea.
Yet China signed an agreement with North Korea in 1986 to return refugees,148
sending back about 10% of them every year.149 The agreement permits North Korean
agents to operate in northern China to intimidate, abduct, and murder refugees.150 It
also imposes arrest quotas on Chinese border police,151 ﬁnes anyone helping refugees a
substantial sum,152 and offers a reward of $500 to any Chinese citizen who turns in a
North Korean refugee.153
In general, China does not consider starving North Koreans to be political refugees,
as if they were ﬂeeing a natural, rather than a politically-designed, food disaster; the
Chinese government claims they are economic migrants.154 Yet they are actually politi-
cal refugees, in the sense that they are ﬂeeing state policies that prevent them from eat-
ing. Moreover, the government’s discriminatory distribution of food—for example, by
denying food to members of the hostile class—constitutes political persecution.155 At
the moment, refugee activists are limited to the argument that even if North Koreans
are not political refugees when they enter China, they become political refugees sur
place when threatened with the torture, imprisonment, starvation, and execution that
follow refugees’ return to North Korea.156 In 2008, 13 women and two men were exe-
cuted merely for planning to go to China.157 To avoid such repatriations and to incor-
porate both faminogenesis and penal starvation into refugee law, state-induced famine
should be considered a crime against humanity—if not a form of genocide—and people
ﬂeeing this crime should be considered refugees.
Despite the laws against genocide and crimes against humanity, and the laws that
ostensibly protect refugees, the international community takes relatively tentative
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actions against North Korea. Strategic and security interests trump concern for human
rights.
Conclusion: Strategic vs. Humanitarian Concerns
Marcus argues that aspects of intentional and reckless faminogenesis are already crimes
under various international laws, but that all these laws should be brought together in a
single UN convention.158 Had such a convention existed, it might have been possible to
indict Kim Jong Il before the ICC without having to prove that his crimes were directed
against a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,” as required by the
UNCG. Such a convention might also have prohibited penal starvation as a speciﬁc
sub-category of the crime of faminogenesis. In the absence of such an agreement, Kim
Jong Il should have been prosecuted for the many crimes against humanity and geno-
cidal acts of which he was guilty. Some of Kim’s close associates were still in power in
2012 and remained candidates for prosecution, as will be his son and successor, Kim
Jong Un, if he does not change North Korea’s food production and distribution policies
and does not immediately ensure that prisoners are properly fed.
But such prosecution is unlikely. The international community’s chief concern
regarding North Korea is strategic, not humanitarian. North Korea has been developing
nuclear weapons since the 1980s and already possesses illegal chemical and biological
weapons.159 Six-party talks among the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China, and
Russia have been taking place sporadically since 2003 with the objective of controlling
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Food aid, along with other types of aid, is sometimes
used as an incentive to persuade North Korea to take part in these talks, and conversely
is sometimes withdrawn or cut if North Korea refuses to cooperate.160
The US is particularly concerned by North Korea’s nuclear aspirations and has had
sanctions against North Korea for some years, partly for the purpose of choking off the
ﬂow of luxury goods into elites’ hands. North Korea ﬁnances its purchases of these
goods by exporting drugs such as opium and heroin and by counterfeiting US cur-
rency.161 China, on the other hand, has an ambiguous relationship with North Korea.
Like the US, it fears nuclear weapons, but it has also been investing in North Korea and
is interested in more bilateral trade. Moreover, China also fears a much larger outﬂow
of refugees from North Korea into its northern region than currently exists, should the
North Korean regime collapse.
South Korea is interested in preserving a stable North Korea. Its ofﬁcial ideology is
that the two Koreas will someday unite, but, in fact, it also fears a refugee overﬂow162
and is wary of the very severe costs of reuniﬁcation, were it ever to occur: one estimate
has put the amount at $900 billion over four decades.163 Finally, South Korea has a very
real fear of attack by North Korea, which already possesses conventional weapons that
could wipe out its capital, Seoul.164 It must therefore balance its concern for its starving
co-ethnics with the need to avert attacks and to protect its own economy.
Thus, it appears that the international community, the US, China, and South Korea
all agree that their ﬁrst strategic priority is a stable North Korea that does not develop
or use nuclear weapons. It is extremely doubtful that either China or Russia would sup-
port referral of North Korea’s leaders to the ICC by the UNSC; even the US might
argue that such an indictment would stand in the way of the six-party negotiations. No
state or international organization has invoked the evolving principle of the responsi-
bility to protect with regard to North Korea.165 The preferred option appears to be to
simply wait for change. News of the prosperity of China and South Korea ﬁlters into
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North Korea via returned refugees and via traders who smuggled videos and DVDs in
from China.166 The more North Koreans encounter goods from the global marketplace
and visitors from the rest of the world, the harder it is for the regime to trumpet its non-
sensical propaganda about being the best country in the world.167
However, since Kim Jong Il’s death the principal concern of the international com-
munity has been to preserve North Korea’s internal stability and avert further nuclear
development. Factional inﬁghting among members of the military or civilian elites
could result in a collapsed or failed state, causing massive refugee outﬂows into China
and South Korea, civil war, and the need for United Nations peacekeeping or peace-
making troops. Such inﬁghting might also trigger actual use of nuclear weapons by one
faction. As long as nuclear threat and internal stability are the international commu-
nity’s chief concerns, the crimes of faminogenesis and penal starvation will likely
remain overlooked.
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